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Firm Heterogeneity and Worker Self-Selection
Bias Estimated Returns to Seniority
David N. Margolis

CIRANO-CRDE-Universite de Montreal
Abstract / Resume
I develop a model under which workers with dierent marginal
productivities self-select into rms based on the rm's seniority re-
ward policy. I show how this may bias upwards the estimates of re-
turns to seniority in cross-sectional and even some longitudinal stud-
ies, when dierences in workforce composition are ignored. I develop
a new estimator of \true" returns to seniority and empirically test
the implications of the model. I show how several previous estimation
strategies over-estimate returns to seniority, particularly in rms that
oer zero or negative returns to job seniority, using a large longitu-
dinal sample of French rms and workers.
Dans ce papier je decris un modele d'embauches ou les individus
avec des productivites marginales heterogenes se trouvent par au-
toselection, dans les entreprises avec des politiques de remuneration
d'anciennete dierentes. Je montre comment ceci peut induire un
biais positif dans les estimateurs de rendement de l'anciennete bases
sur les donnees en coupe transversales et me^me certains estimateurs
bases sur les donnees longitudinales. Je decris un nouvel estimateur
du \vrai" rendement de l'anciennete, que j'utilise pour tester les im-
plications du modele. Je montre comment certaines autres approches
surestiment les rendements de l'anciennete, surtout dans les rmes
qui remunerent tres peu l'anciennete, en utilisant une grande base de
donnees longitudinales des employeurs et employes francais.
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1. Introduction
The empirical relation between job seniority and individual earnings has
spawned a large literature
1
, the vast majority of which has supposed that
all rms reward (or fail to reward) job seniority according to the same
policy
2
. However, there has been considerable theoretical work to sug-
gest that rms might have incentives to propose dierent seniority reward
policies, particularly with the goal of inducing self-selection of individuals
based on characteristics that are not immediately observable to the rm
3
.
If these models are correct and rms do oer dierent seniority reward poli-
cies, then the \accepted" models used to estimate the relation between job
seniority and earnings deserve reexamination.
This paper proposes an empirical procedure that allows the econome-
trician to distinguish \true" returns to seniority, dened as the increase in
earnings due exclusively to continued employment by the same rm, from
changes in earnings due to the evolution in cohort quality arising from
worker heterogeneity and self-selection. A simple theoretical model is de-
rived to demonstrate how the bias is introduced into standard estimators
that do not account for worker heterogeneity and self-selection. A new es-
timator is then derived and applied to a large longitudinal data set that
allows the econometrician to follow individuals through time and across
enterprises, and that allows the econometrician to study the evolution of
cohort earnings through time within an enterprise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives a simple model
where rms compete for workers in a labor market, and workers choose their
employer based on the contract oered. Firms oer a contract that is com-
prised of xed component, a seniority-reward component, an experience-
reward component, and a component reecting the expected productivity of
an individual's cohort. I introduce a simple mechanism similar to that sug-
gested by Weiss and Wang [1990] whereby individuals of dierent marginal
productivities have dierent survival probabilities. This generates self se-
lection of individuals, where rms that oer higher deferred compensation
(as seniority rewards) relative to base compensation attract individuals who
perceive their probability of separation from their employer in a given pe-
riod to be \low", and rms that oer lower deferred returns relative to base
1
See, for example, Topel [1991], Altonji and Shakotko [1987], Abraham and Farber
[1987].
2
A notable exception is Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (AKM) [1994].
3
Examples of this work include Salop and Salop [1976] and, more recently, Weiss and
Wang [1990].
2
compensation attract individuals who perceive their probability of separa-
tion in a given period to be \high". I show that if there is uncertainty in
an individual's belief about her hazard function, this will lead to estimates
of returns to job seniority that are biased upwards
4
. I also show that these
biases will be strongest for rms that reward job seniority the least, and
that these biases lead to biased estimators of returns to job seniority based
on \pooled" data, such as those estimated by Topel [1991].
Section 3 then derives a new estimator of returns to seniority. This new
estimator takes into account the potential problems for standard estima-
tors as presented in section 2, and shows how to distinguish econometrically
between earnings evolution due to contractual provisions and earnings evo-
lution due to changes in expected cohort quality. After briey describing
the French individual panel data in section 4, section 5 describes the em-
pirical implementation of the model of section 2. I rst estimate a standard
OLS-type model, an individual xed-eects model and the model proposed
by Topel [1991] on the French data, and compare these estimated returns
to seniority to both the employment-weighted and equally weighted aver-
ages of those of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (AKM) [1994], which used
the same data as I use here, albeit a dierent estimation strategy. I then
estimate returns to seniority using the cohort-based estimator proposed in
section 3, and compare these results to the results obtained by AKM [1994]
in order to evaluate the mean bias present even in estimators that permit
heterogeneous returns to seniority. I nd that even these estimators con-
tain a signicant bias component in the vast majority of rms, and that the
rms that propose the most \radical" seniority reward policies (seniority
rewards with the highest absolute values) are also the rms that have the
smallest employment. This suggests that there may be a relation between
oered seniority rewards and recruiting ability, as a self-selection model
with risk-averse agents might predict. Section 6 summarizes the results
and concludes.
2. Self-Selection and Biases in Estimators of Returns to
Seniority
In this section, I use a simple model of self-selection based on ability and
returns to seniority to show how previous estimates that do not explicitly
account for heterogeneous seniority reward policies and self-selection are
4
Throughout the development of the model I maintain the assumption that high
marginal productivity workers have lower hazard rates. This is done for expositional
purposes only, and all of the results hold if the hazard rates are reversed, except that
the bias becomes positive instead of negative. The empirical work at the ens of section
5 gives an indication as to which hazard rate is greater.
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likely to produce upwardly-biased estimators of returns to seniority. Sec-
tion 2.1 derives a model in which rms compete for workers in the labor
market, and workers choose their employer based on the contract oered.
Firms oer a contract that is comprised of xed dierential with respect to
an individual's expected productivity, a seniority-reward component, and
a component reecting the evolution of the an individual's expected pro-
ductivity. This includes both the evolution of observable individual specic
characteristics (such as total labor market experience), individual specic
characteristics that are observable to the rm but not the econometrician,
and the evolution of expected productivity based on changes in the com-
position of an individual's cohort (characteristics that are observable by
neither the rm nor the econometrician). Individuals are observed once
per period with a xed probability
5
, and higher productivity individuals
are less likely to commit a mistake while being observed that is serious
enough to result in termination, while lower productivity individuals are
more likely to be red if observed. This generates self selection of indi-
viduals when contracts with dierent earnings proles are proposed, with
rms that oer higher seniority rewards relative to the xed component of
compensation attracting individuals who perceive their probability of ter-
mination in a given period to be \low", and rms that oer lower deferred
returns relative to the xed component of compensation attracting individ-
uals who perceive their probability of termination in a given period to be
\high".
Section 2.2 shows how, if there is uncertainty in an individual's belief
about her hazard function, estimates of returns to job seniority will be
biased upwards. These biases are shown to be strongest for rms that
reward job seniority the least. Finally, I show that these biases lead to
biased estimators of returns to job seniority based on \pooled" data, such
as those estimated by Topel [1991], and even those that allow heterogeneity
in returns to seniority but suppose constant cohort quality, such as those
estimated by AKM [1994].
2.1. A Theoretical Model of Self-Selection and Seniority Rewards
Suppose that there are two types of workers, H and L, where type-H work-
ers have unobserved characteristics that contribute Q
H
to their marginal
productivities, type-L workers have unobserved characteristics that con-
tribute Q
L
to their marginal productivities, and Q
H
> Q
L
. Furthermore,
suppose that rms monitor a share s of their workforce each period, and
5
In a more general context, one can suppose that individuals have a xed probability
of risking separation from their employer, be it employer-induced separation (ring) or
employee-induced separation (quitting).
4
the probability that a type-H individual will be red as a result of some
problem occurring while being monitored is P
H
, while the probability that
a type-L individual will be red during monitoring is P
L
, and P
H
< P
L
< 1.
Individuals know P
H
, P
L
, Q
H
, Q
L
, s and their type (although this assump-
tion will be relaxed in section 2.2 below), although they cannot tell if they
have been observed. Firms cannot distinguish type-H from type-L workers
directly, however they know P
H
, P
L
, Q
H
, and Q
L
.
Firms are perfectly competitive in both product and labor markets. This
imposes 2 conditions. First, all rms earn zero expected prots ex ante, i.e.
the present discounted value of expected total labor costs equals the present
discounted value of expected total output
6
. Second, workers are paid (as a
base) their expected marginal product, with rms using xed dierentials
with respect to expected marginal productivity and xed seniority reward
policies to incite workers of dierent types to self-select towards dierent
rms. This implies that, if rms made no attempts to attract workers of
particular types, and if the expected share of type-L workers hired by rm
j at date T
0
in a cohort of age t is `
j;T
0
+t
, individual i employed in rm j
hired at date T
0
and employed for t periods would receive earnings
y
i;T
0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i
+ `
j;T
0
+t
Q
L
+ (1  `
j;T
0
+t
)Q
H
;
where X
i;T
0
+t
is a vector of measurable characteristics of individual i at date
T
0
+t,  is a vector reecting the contribution of each of these characteristics
to her marginal revenue product and 
i
is an individual specic xed eect
that reects characteristics that contribute to the individual's marginal
revenue product and are observable by the rm (hence compensated) but
not by the econometrician.
Firms oer new workers a given contract (
j
; 
j
; s
j
), where 
j
is a xed
dierential with respect to expected marginal productivity that an individ-
ual employed in rm j earns, and 
j
is the return to an additional year of
seniority
7
. Thus individual i employed by rm j at date T
0
and employed
6
In this analysis we ignore non-labor costs. Alternatively, we could consider that
rms have Leontief-type production functions, and that Q
H
and Q
L
are net of capital
costs.
7
In this paper I suppose that individuals choose their employer as if they expected
to stay with the same employer throughout their career. This reduces the complexity
of the individual's decision problem from one of choosing a sequence of contracts with a
sequence of potentially stochastic termination dates to one of choosing a single contract
with a single stochastic terminationdate. In this sense, workers do not have \employment
histories" that could be used by potential employers to gain more information about the
individual's type.
Alternatively, I could allow individuals to accept several contracts sequentially and
suppose that rms do not observe each other's s
j
and that individuals who are mistaken
in their assessment of their own types never learn the truth. In this case, since P
L
< 1,
5
for t periods earns:
y
j;T
0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i
+ 
j
+ 
j
t+ `
j;T
0
+t
Q
L
+ (1  `
j;T
0
+t
)Q
H
: (2.1)
Workers and rms share a common discount rate . As in most of
the literature on self selection and labor contracts, they make one choice
from the set of available contracts f(
j
; 
j
; s
j
)g, selecting the contract that
maximizes expected discounted earnings in the job, conditional on the indi-
vidual's observable characteristics, perception of her type, and the contract
oered. If the employment relation is terminated, the worker takes her
reservation utility of 0 for the rest of time.
Let N
j;T
0
+t
denote the size of the cohort of employees employed at the
date T
0
by rm j observed at the date T
0
+ t. The expected number of
type-L employees employed by rm j in the cohort t periods old at date
T
0
+ t can be written
L
j;T
0
+t
= `
j;T
0
+t
N
j;T
0
+t
and the expected number of type-H employees employed by rm j in the
cohort t periods old at date T
0
+ t can be written
H
j;T
0
+t
= (1  `
j;T
0
+t
)N
j;T
0
+t
:
At the time a cohort is hired, L
j;T
0
= `
j;T
0
N
j;T
0
andH
j;T
0
= (1 `
j;T
0
)N
j;T
0
.
After one period goes by, a share s
j
of the workforce is sampled. Those
type-L workers sampled separate with probability P
L
and stay with prob-
ability (1   P
L
). Similarly, those type-H workers sampled separate with
probability P
H
and stay with probability (1   P
H
). This implies that the
rm's workforce after one period will be composed as follows.
L
j;T
0
+1
= L
j;T
0
(1  s
j
P
L
)
H
j;T
0+
1
= H
j;T
0
(1  s
j
P
H
)
N
j;T
0
+1
= N
j;T
0
(1  s
j
[`
j;T
0
P
L
+ (1  `
j;T
0
)P
H
])
`
j;T
0
+1
=
`
j;T
0
1 s
j
[
`
j;T
0
P
L
+
(
1 `
j;T
0
)
P
H
]
knowing individual i's seniority at the date of separation for the previous job can not be
used to gain information about her type. This does not, however, reduce to complexity
of the individual's decision problem.
In Margolis [1994], I derive a two-period model where workers are heterogeneous in
the same general manner as this paper and can choose to leave their initial employer
after one period or risk being red after being evaluated. Firms learn about the workers
based on their choice of initial contract and their decision to quit or risk being red.
6
By induction, it is clear that
L
j;T
0
+t
= L
j;T
0
+t 1
(1  s
j
P
L
) = L
j;T
0
(1  s
j
P
L
)
t
H
j;T
0
+t
= H
j;T
0
+t 1
(1  s
j
P
H
) = H
j;T
0
(1  s
j
P
H
)
t
N
j;T
0
+t
= N
j;T
0
+t 1
(1  s
j
[`
j;T
0
+t 1
P
L
+ (1  `
j;T
0
+t 1
)P
H
])
and
`
j;T
0
+t
=
L
j;T
0
+t
L
j;T
0
+t
+H
j;T
0
+t
=
`
j;T
0
(1 s
j
P
L
)
t
`
j;T
0
(1 s
j
P
L
)
t
+
(
1 `
j;T
0
)
(1 s
j
P
H
)
t
: (2.2)
Given equation (2.1), individual i who believes herself to be of type q
will have expected discounted earnings from accepting a contract (
j
; 
j
; s
j
)
at date T
0
of:
Y
i;T
0
j q =
1
X
t=1

t 1
(1  s
j
P
q
)
t
(2.3)
(X
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i
+ 
j
+ 
j
t+ `
j;T
0
+t
Q
L
+ (1  `
j;T
0
+t
)Q
H
) :
Equation 2.3 can be rewritten as
Y
i;T
0
j q =
(1  s
j
P
q
)(
i
+ 
j
+Q
H
)
1  (1  s
j
P
q
)
+

j
(1  s
j
P
q
)
(1  (1  s
j
P
q
))
2
+A (2.4)
where
A =
1
X
t=1

t 1
(1  s
j
P
q
)
t
(X
i;T
0
+t
+ `
j;T
0
+t
(Q
L
  Q
H
)) :
Using 2.4, it can be shown that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween returns to seniority (
j
) and the earnings dierential with respect to
expected marginal productivity (
j
) is
MRS
;
(q) = 1  (1  s
j
P
q
): (2.5)
This implies that an individual of type q requires 
j
to increase by 1 (1 
s
j
P
q
) for every unit of 
j
given up if utility is to remain constant
8
. Since
P
L
> P
H
, this implies that MRS
;
(L) > MRS
;
(H). In other words, if
8
Note that there is no factor in this expression corresponding to
@`
j;T
0
@
or
@`
j;T
0
@
.
This is due to the presence of only 2 types of individuals. If an individual were to choose
a contract (
1
; 
1
; s
1
) over a contract (
2
; 
2
; s
2
), that implies her utility under contract
7
an employer proposes two contracts of equal expected total compensation
cost over the expected duration of the contract, but one has a high 
j
and
a low 
j
while the other has a low 
j
and a high 
j
, type L workers will
prefer the rst contract to the second, and type H workers will provide the
second to the rst, provided
4
j
=   (1  (1  s
j
P
~q
))4
j
; (2.6)
when P
L
 P
~q
 P
H
9
.
In order for this separating equilibrium to exist, it has to be shown that
1. there exist at least two contracts f(
1
; 
1
; s) ; (
2
; 
2
; s)g such that
each contract provides the employer with zero expected prots over
the expected duration of the contract conditional upon who accepts
it (`
j;T
0
) and
2. there exists some P
~q
, P
L
 P
~q
 P
H
, such that, for each contract,
(
1
 
2
)
(
1
 
2
)
=   (1  (1  sP
~q
)).
Start by noting that the structure of the contracts described in equation
(2.1) is such that each worker receives her expected marginal productivity
as compensation at each point in time, plus the 
j
and 
j
t components,
which can be used to shift the dates of arrival of compensation and o-
set current-period compensation from current-period expected productiv-
ity. Next, consider the contract (0; 0; s), where 0  s  1. This contract
1 is greater than or equal to the utility she would receive under contract 2.
When
U (
1
; 
1
; s
1
) = U (
2
; 
2
; s
2
) ;
the individual may change the contract chosen for a marginal change in  or . But such
a case suggests that the (unique) contract on oer is a pooling equilibrium. Rothschild
and Stiglitz [1976] showed that a pooling contract can never be a Nash equilibrium, and
thus we need only be concerned with the case of U (
1
; 
1
; s
1
) > U (
2
; 
2
; s
2
).
Since I am implicitly assuming that an individual's utility is a continuously dieren-
tiable function of her present discounted value of earnings, a marginal change in either
 or  will not change her choice of contracts when
U (
1
; 
1
; s
1
) > U (
2
; 
2
; s
2
) :
This is because the function that maps contracts into present discounted values is con-
tinuously dierentiable in both  and , and thus the composite function that maps from
contract into utilities is also continuously dierentiable in  and .
9
In what follows, I assume that the share of individuals risking separation each period
is the same under the 2 contracts, i.e. s
i
= s
j
8 i; j. Since the observation rate just
has the eect of shifting the failure probabilities in one rm relative to another (albeit
under a particular functional form), this restriction implies that the probability that an
individual of a given type will be red in any period is the same across all rms. I make
this assumption to simplify the exposition; allowing s to vary across rms only adds
another dimension of exibility to the set of available contracts and does not change the
theoretical results in any substantial manner.
8
satises condition 1, that the oering rm earns zero prots, since the wage
bill at each point in time for each worker is equal to that worker's expected
marginal product
10
.
Next, consider the contract ( 
j
; [1   (1  s [P
H
+ "])]
j
; s), where

j
> 0. By construction, the condition for a separating equilibrium given in
2 is satised. Furthermore, since this contract will attract type-H workers
while type-L workers will prefer contract 1, `
j;T
0
= 0. Given the structure of
contracts as described in equation 2.4, it can be shown that, as "! 0, this
contract also generates zero expected prots over its lifetime and thereby
satises condition 1. Thus we have shown, using logic similar to that of
Salop and Salop [1976], that there exists a separating Nash equilibrium, and
that it is not necessarily optimal for all rms to oer the same seniority
reward policy.
2.2. The Bias Induced by Self-Selection
Now suppose that individuals have some uncertainty as to their hazard
function, i.e. type-H workers consider themselves type-L with probability
f
LjH
, while type-L workers consider themselves type-H with probability
f
HjL
. In the context of the model described above in section 2.1, this implies
that type-L individuals will choose the \wrong" contract with probability
f
HjL
, while type-H workers choose the \wrong" contract with probability
f
LjH
. In this case, a separating equilibrium will generate
`
1;T
0
=
(1 f
HjL
)
(1 f
HjL
)+(1 )f
LjH
`
2;T
0
=
f
HjL
f
HjL
+(1 )(1 f
LjH
)
(2.7)
and the zero expected prot condition implies that contract 2 will have to
be of the form suggested in footnote 10, namely
0
B
B
@
 
2
;

2
[1   (1  sP
L
)] [1   (1  sP
H
)]

`
2;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))+
(
1 `
2;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
`
2;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))
2
+
(
1 `
2;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
2

; s
1
C
C
A
10
Of course, this is not the only contract that generates zero prots for the oering
rm. Any contract that satises

j
=  
j
[1   (1  sP
L
)] [1   (1  sP
H
)]

`
j;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))+
(
1 `
j;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
`
j;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))
2
+
(
1 `
j;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
2

will generate zero prots for the rm that proposes it. In the case where employees
know their type with certainty, `
j;T
0
= 1 for the rms that attract type-L workers and
`
j;T
0
= 0 for the rms that attract type-H workers. This reduces to the condition that

j
=   (1  (1  s
j
P
q
))
j
, where q corresponds to the type of worker that the rm
attracts.
9
where 
2
> 0 and  is the proportion of type-L workers in the labor
force. Note that this contract also satises the condition for a separating
equilibrium (condition 2 above), with
P
~q
=
[
`
2;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))
2
]
P
L
+
[(
1 `
2;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
2
]
P
H
`
2;T
0
(1 sP
L
)(1 (1 sP
H
))
2
+
(
1 `
2;T
0
)
(1 sP
H
)(1 (1 sP
L
))
2
which satises P
L
> P
~q
> P
H
.
This has important implications for most estimators of returns to expe-
rience. When individuals are certain of their type, it is clear from equation
2.2 that `
j;T
0
+t
= `
j;T
0
for any t, meaning that expected productivity of the
cohort was not evolving. Thus any estimator that consistently estimates
returns to tenure under the assumption that 
j
= 
k
for all (j; k) would
consistently estimate the employment-weighted mean of 
j
in the sample
population.
On the other hand, once `
j;T
0
=2 f0; 1g, the expected productivity of the
workforce will evolve over time, as workers of dierent types hazard out of
their cohorts at dierent rates. Furthermore, it can be shown (after some
messy algebra) that
@(`
j;T
0
+t+1
 `
j;T
0
+t
)
@`
j;T
0
=
(1 sP
L
)
t
(1 sP
H
)
t+1
(
`
j;T
0
(1 sP
L
)
t+1
+(1 `
j;T
0
)(1 sP
H
)
t+1
)
2
 
(1 sP
L
)
t
(1 sP
H
)
t
(
`
j;T
0
(1 sP
L
)
t
+(1 `
j;T
0
)(1 sP
H
)
t
)
2
> 0:
In other words, the larger the initial share of type-L workers in the cohort,
the faster the expected productivity will be seen to rise.
This fact has implications for both homogeneous seniority returns esti-
mators and heterogeneous returns-homogeneous workforce estimators. In
the rst case, this suggests that not only will estimated returns to seniority
in low \true" returns (and thus high `
j;T
0
) rms be overestimated, but that
the larger the share of low-
j
rms in the sample, the larger the overesti-
mate is likely to be
11
. In the case of estimators that allow for rm-level
heterogeneity in 
j
but not in `
j;T
0
, the estimated returns to seniority will
be biased upwards by a larger amount in the rms that reward seniority
relatively poorly than in those rms that reward seniority relatively well.
Whether or not this bias is will be suciently large to overcome the dier-
ence in true returns to seniority (and thus provide the opposite impression;
namely that the low actual 
j
rms will have estimated returns higher than
the high actual 
j
rms) depends on many factors, including 
1
  
2
, ,
f
L=H
and f
H=L
, and is not predictable a priori.
11
This conditionposes particular problems for models of labor markets that suppose an
\ocean of small rms" in which only the large employers reward seniority. In these models
the small rms, which are more numerous, will all appear to be rewarding seniority
positively, which might invite the econometrician to reject the \ocean of small rms"
hypothesis incorrectly.
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2.2.1. Topel's 2-step Estimator
Consider the two-step estimator of returns to job seniority proposed by
Topel [1991]. In this model, a rst-step equation of the form
4y
i;T
0
+t
= (
1
+ 
1
)4t
i;j;T
0
+t
+ 
2
4t
2
i;j;T
0
+t
+ 
3
4t
3
i;j;T
0
+t
+ 
4
4t
4
i;j;T
0
+t
+ 
2
4Exp
2
i;T
0
+t
+ 
3
4Exp
3
i;T
0
+t
+ 
4
4Exp
4
i;T
0
+t
+4"
i;T
0
+t
(2.8)
is used to recover estimates of higher-order terms in returns to seniority
and returns to experience (4t
i;j;T
0
+t
is the change in the number of years
of seniority of individual i in rm j between dates T
0
+ t and T
0
+ t   1,
4Exp
i;T
0
+t
is the change in the level of total labor market experience of
individual i between dates T
0
+t and T
0
+t 1, and4"
i;T
0
+t
is the dierence
in stochastic components of individual i's earnings between dates T
0
+ t
and T
0
+ t   1). Note that the coecients 
1
through 
4
do not have j
subscripts, implying that they are shared by all rms in the economy. The
coecient on the dierence in level seniority is interpreted as the sum of
returns to seniority (in levels) and returns to experience (in levels). Since
the year-on-year dierence in seniority is 1, as is the year-on-year dierence
in experience, for an individual who does not change employers during the
course of the year
12
, this is essentially the intercept in a rst-dierenced
regression
13
. A second-step equation of the form
~y
i;T
0
+t
= 
1
Exp
i;T
0
+ F
i;T
0
+t
+ e
i;T
0
+t
where
~y
i;T
0
+t
= y
i;T
0
+t
 
d
(
1
+ 
1
)t
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
2
t
2
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
3
t
3
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
4
t
4
i;j;T
0
+t
 
^

2
Exp
2
i;T
0
+t
 
^

3
Exp
3
i;T
0
+t
 
^

4
Exp
4
i;T
0
+t
is then used to decompose the estimated intercept
d
(
1
+ 
1
) into the part

1
that should be attributed to returns to seniority and the part 
1
that
should be attributed to returns to experience. Topel argues that, in the
presence of individual eects 
i
and rm eects 
j
, the rst step of his
two step procedure allows one to recover a consistent estimate of (
1
+ 
1
),
as well as consistent estimates of 
1
through 
4
and 
1
through 
4
. The
12
For the higher-order terms, such as t
2
i;j;T
0
+t
or Exp
2
i;T
0
+t
, the year-on-year dier-
ences will be dierent for all employers except the rst employer encountered in the
worker's career.
13
If the individual stayed with the same employer during the entire year but suered
temporary layos during the course of the year, t
i;j;T
0
+t
would be less than one, al-
though the coecient would still confound returns to seniority and returns to experience.
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second step allows one to obtain an upper bound on 
1
, and thus a lower
bound on 
1
, the (level) returns to seniority
14
.
The rst problem with this procedure is that, by constraining all rms
to reward seniority in the same manner, it precludes the possibility that
rms might strategically use dierent levels of initial earnings and rates of
earnings growth of the career to incite individuals with particular combina-
tions of productive capacities (unobservable by the rm) to join their rms.
Thus the rms do not try to take advantage of the heterogeneity of the pool
of available workers, which is equivalent to imposing that employers do not
behave rationally when choosing their compensation policies
15
.
This approach could be applied on a rm-by-rm basis, but that im-
poses an entirely dierent set of diculties. First, if rewards to total labor
market experience are meant to reect the market's perception of the rate
of accumulation of general human capital, then it would be incorrect to
allow 
1
through 
4
to vary by rm. Imposing this restriction across re-
gression equations can be complicated econometrically for data sets with
large numbers of employers and individuals
16
. However, once one can sep-
arately determine the rm-specic returns to seniority 
1j
through 
4j
in
Topel's original model, one can directly control for individual- and rm-
specic eects 
i
as in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis [1994] (see below),
and thus the two-step procedure becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, with-
out a theoretical justication for the presence of the higher order terms in
seniority in either the initial earnings equation or the rst-dierenced one
estimated in step one, there is no clear interpretation of the coecients on
seniority squared, cubed or to the fourth power.
On the other hand, the model suggested in section 2.1 above provides
such a justication. The coecients on the higher order terms can be
interpreted as the second- third- and fourth-order terms in a fourth-order
Taylor expansion of `
j;T
0
+t
around T
0
. Unfortunately, every term in the
fourth-order expansion of `
j;T
0
+t
is dierent from the corresponding term
14
This estimator of 
1
is an upper bound due to anticipated covariance between
Exp
i;T
0
and e
i;T
0
+t
. The idea that \good jobs last longer" implies that jobs that pay
more will have been held longer, and thus a lower initial level of experience is likely to
be found in jobs with above-average earnings conditional on all observables. This is a
testable assumption, and althoughTopel does not reject it for the U.S. data, it is rejected
on the French data used here.
15
This could nevertheless be a fairly accurate representation of certain unionized labor
markets, where the employer is not completely free to choose intercept and slope of the
earnings proles of its workers. On the other hand, if employers are free to choose their
compensation policies, this specication will only be optimal if attempting to induce the
sort of selection described above would be too costly for all rms, in which case all rms
would optimally choose the same compensation policy.
16
See Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1994), and below, for an econometric procedure
designed to handle this sort of computational problem.
12
in the fourth-order expansion of `
j;T
0
+t
  `
j;T
0
+t 1
. In addition, the rst-
order term will represent a combination of \real" returns to seniority (the

j
in equation (2.1) above) and returns to changes in cohort quality
17
.
This suggests that ~y
i;T
0
+t
used as the dependent variable in the second-
step regression is inappropriate, since the coecients on the tenure terms
of the Taylor expansion from the rst step equation will not, in general, be
identical to those from the non-dierenced earnings equation.
2.2.2. Abowd, Kramarz andMargolis' HeterogeneousReturns Es-
timator
AKM [1994] used the same data set I use here to estimate rm-specic
intercepts (
j
) and rm-specic coecients on seniority (which might be
interpreted as \returns to seniority" (
j
)). Their initial statistical model is
of the form
y
i;T
0
+t
= x
i;T
0
+t
 + u
i
 + 
i
+ 
j
+ 
1j
t+ 
2j
T
1
(t  10) + "
i;T
0
+t
(2.9)
which is similar to the form in equation (2.1) except that they explicitly
decompose the X
i;T
0
+t
from equation (2.1) into a time-varying components
(x
it
) and a non-time-varying component (u
i
), and they model nonlinearities
in the returns to seniority with a linear spline function having a break at 10
years. Their model is essentially descriptive, and thus they do not attempt
to explicitly model the source of the nonlinearities in returns to seniority, as
is done in section 2.1 above. The econometric procedure involves projecting
the rm-eect onto a vector of rm and person characteristics constructed
so as to allow the desired correlation among the individual-eects and the
rm-eects. This permits consistent estimation of the components of  from
equation (2.1) that correspond to time-varying individual specic character-
istics. A second step uses least squares to decompose the non-time-varying,
individual specic component of earnings (which they call 
i
) into the ob-
servable components (representing the rest of the X
i
terms in equation
(2.1)) and the unobservable component 
i
. A third step uses the resulting
estimates to generate consistent estimates of the rm-eects 
j
and 
j
.
This procedure provides a good starting point for discriminating be-
tween true returns to seniority and returns to evolution in cohort quality.
However, the estimated coecient 
1j
does not provide enough information
to be able to recover the true 
j
, and even considering 
1j
and 
2j
together
does not provide enough information. The basic problem is that
17
Section 2.2.2 below discusses this point more thoroughly.
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1j
= E

@y
i;T
0
+t
@t
j t < 10

(2.10)
= 
j
+ (Q
L
 Q
H
)E

@`
j;T
0
+t
@t
j t < 10

and

2j
= E
h
@y
i;T
0
+t
@t
j t  10
i
  
1j
= (Q
L
  Q
H
)
n
E
h
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j;T
0
+t
@t
j t  10
i
  E
h
@`
j;T
0
+t
@t
j t < 10
io
:
Clearly, given the fact that `
j;T
0
+t
is nonlinear in t in a rather complicated
way, these expressions do not allow one to recover 
j
directly.
3. A New Estimator of Returns to Job Seniority
Neither the estimator presented in section 2.2.1 nor in section 2.2.2 explic-
itly allowed for self-selection of individuals based on the oered contract,
and thus neither gives a clean interpretation of the nonlinearity in returns to
seniority. However, the expression for 
1j
in equation (2.10) above suggests
an econometric approach to directly estimating 
j
.
The ideal situation would be to be able to estimate separately, for each
starting year (

T
0
) and each level of seniority (

t), the equation
y
i;T
0
+t
= x
i;T
0
+t
 + u
i
 + 
i
+ 
j
+ 
j
t+ "
i;T
0
+t
(3.1)
using the method suggested in AKM [1994]. According to equation (2.10),
the estimated ^
j
could be interpreted as 
j
+ (Q
L
  Q
H
)
@`
j;

T
0
+

t
@

t
. The
expression for
@`
j;

T
0
+

t
@

t
, although rather messy, is calculable. We could
look across levels of seniority for the same cohort and, given at least 6
years with estimated ^
j
, recover the parameters 
j
; Q
L
; Q
H
; s
j
P
L
; s
j
P
H
;
and `
j;T
0
. More than 6 years of data would provide overidentifying restric-
tions Furthermore, if we had 2 cohorts and 8 estimated ^
j
, or 3 cohorts
and 9 estimated ^
j
, etc..., we would be in the same situation. And addi-
tional estimated ^
j
would provide additional overidentifying restrictions. If
we were willing to suppose that Q
L
; Q
H
; P
L
, and P
H
were constant across
rms, we could also use cross-rm restrictions to recover s
j
and to test
hypotheses about Q
L
; Q
H
; P
L
, and P
H
:
Unfortunately, regardless of the number of individuals in the cohort, one
can not hope to estimate ^
j
unless there is some variation in t, which we
would be precluding if we were to run regressions by cohort-seniority level.
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On the other hand, if we just ran the regression (3.1) for all observations
having the same entering year (

T
0
) for all seniority levels, the interpretation
of ^
j
would now be
^
j;T
0
= E

@y
i;T
0
+t
@t
j T
0
=

T
0

= 
j
+ (Q
L
  Q
H
)E

@`
j;T
0
+t
@t
j T
0
=

T
0

:
(3.2)
Note that although the expectation of the derivative is no longer a constant
(it will vary with the distribution of observations within the cohort across
tenure levels, which will in turn be a function of P
H
; P
L
; s, and `
j;T
0
), by
considering only workers starting at T
0
=

T
0
, we are eectively controlling
for `
j;T
0
.
We run this regression for each entering cohort within the rm
18
and
assign the estimated ^
j;T
0
for each cohort to all observations corresponding
to individuals hired at T
0
. Denote the vector of estimated ^
j;T
0
correspond-
ing to all of the observations in all of the cohorts employed by rm j by ,
j
,
and regress ,
j
on tenure and an intercept.
,
j
=  
1j
+  
2j
t+ &
j
(3.3)
The coecients of this secondary regression have clear interpretations.
First and foremost,
^
 
1j
= 
j
. In other words, the intercept from the
regression of estimated returns to seniority on seniority is the \true" re-
turns to seniority. The estimate of the coecient on seniority is
^
 
2j
=
E
h
@
2
`
j;T
0
+t
@t
2
i
. We would like to be able to use this estimate, in con-
junction with the estimated ^
j;T
0
, to recover the remaining parameters
(Q
L
; Q
H
; s
j
P
L
; s
j
P
H
; `
j;T
1
0
; :::; `
j;T
N
0
), where T
N
0
refers to the cohort enter-
ing at date N . Unfortunately this will not be possible, since there will be as
many `
j;T
n
0
terms as there are cohorts, which is one less than the number of
\data" points we have available from which to recover the parameters. If we
are willing to impose restrictions on the `
j;T
n
0
terms (such as `
j;T
n
0
= `
j;T
0
for all n), we can try to solve the nonlinear system of equations to recover
the other parameters of interest. And if we are willing to impose other
restrictions on the other parameters (such as equality across rms as men-
tioned above), we should be able to recover s
j
and test hypotheses on the
other estimated parameters.
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As mentioned below, the data requirements necessary to implement this procedure
are fairly rigorous. For all individuals that are members of cohorts with fewer than 3
observations, or for which no individual survived into the second year, we will be unable
to recover a separate ^
j
. Thus, in addition to the cohort-specic ^
j
estimates, one may
be forced to pool the observations from the remaining cohorts. In this case, one must
assume that these smaller, or less successful, cohorts all had the same initial compostion
`
j;T
0
.
15
Unfortunately, the requirements placed on the data are slightly more
onerous than in AKM [1994]. First, the procedure requires that we have at
least 3 observations per cohort on which we run the third-step regression.
Among the observations in a given rm cohort, we must have more than
one year's worth of data for at least one individual. In addition, in order
to recover the \true" 
j
, we must have at least 3 cohorts in the same rm
which meet these requirements. Fortunately, the data used here allows us
to apply this procedure to rms covering the vast majority of observations
in our sample.
4. The French Longitudinal Data
The data used in the empirical work described in section 5 below are
the same as those described in AKM [1994]. These data are a panel of
individual-rmmatched observations with identifying information sucient
to follow both rms and individuals over time, collected by INSEE (the
French National Statistics Institute). The data cover the period 1976-1987,
although observations from 1981 and 1983 were not made available by IN-
SEE. They cover all workers employed in France born in October of an
even-numbered year, thus ensuring a random initial sample of individuals.
The data made available concern all such people working in enterprises with
10 employees or more, and French government employees are also excluded
(although employees of government-owned enterprises are present in the
data).
These data were cleaned
19
and compiled into a database containing
initially 4,784,284 observations, of which 3,099,056 were from men and
1,685,228 were from women. A simple regression of the form
LFRAISRE
i;T
0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+t
 + "
i;T
0
+t
was run on these data, where LFRAISRE
i;T
0
+t
represents the log of the
real annualized total compensation cost, and the vector X
i;T
0
+t
includes the
variables male, Paris region, experience through experience to the fourth
power, 7 education-level indicators, and 10 year indicators. All observations
more than 5 standard deviations away from their predicted values were
considered outliers. These observations were eliminated from the data set
on which the Topel, AKM and cohort-based estimations were generated, but
section 5.1 below presents the results of models run on both the full and
outliers-eliminated data. Table 4.1 provides some basic sample statistics
for both of the data sets used.
19
See the data appendix of AKM [1994] for details on the preliminary treatment of
the data.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Data used in OLS and Fixed-Eects
Estimation
Variable Name All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
LFRAISRE 4.251 0.556 4.257 0.519
Seniority 6.425 7.111 6.437 7.112
Seniority
2
=100 0.918 1.475 0.920 1.476
Seniority
3
=1000 1.584 3.266 1.587 3.268
Seniority
4
=10000 3.018 7.672 3.024 7.677
Experience 16.612 11.920 16.612 11.915
Experience
2
=100 4.180 4.934 4.179 4.930
Experience
3
=1000 12.603 19.533 12.596 19.516
Experience
4
=10000 41.808 78.875 41.772 78.778
Elementary School 0.168 0.157 0.168 0.157
Junior High School 0.067 0.088 0.067 0.088
High School 0.059 0.084 0.059 0.083
Basic Vocational-
Technical School 0.239 0.178 0.239 0.178
Advanced Vocational-
Technical School 0.064 0.087 0.064 0.087
Technical/Undergraduate
University 0.060 0.097 0.060 0.097
Graduate School Degree 0.039 0.085 0.039 0.085
Male 0.648 0.478 0.648 0.478
Paris Region 0.270 0.444 0.269 0.444
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5. Empirical Examination of the Ability-Seniority-Earn-
ings Relation
In this section, I use the French individual panel data to estimate returns
to job seniority using an OLS estimator, an individual xed-eects panel
estimator and Topel's [1991] two-step panel estimator, which I then com-
pare to AKM's [1994] correlated eects panel estimator. Finally, I estimate
the cohort-based panel estimator proposed in section 3 and use it to show
what part of estimated returns to seniority in the AKM [1994] correlated
eects panel estimator is due to \true" seniority returns and what part is
due to evolution in cohort quality.
5.1. Simple Estimators: OLS and Individual Fixed Eects
I rst estimate returns to job seniority using a simple specication of the
form
log (y
i;T
0
+t
) = X
i;T
0
+t
+ "
i;T
0
+t
(5.1)
where the matrixX
i;T
0
+t
contains seniority through seniority to the fourth
power (rescaled), experience through experience to the fourth power (re-
scaled), seven indicators for educational attainment (highest degree termi-
nated), an indicator variable for a job in the Paris metropolitan area, and
an indicator for the sex of the individual. The dependent variable was mea-
sured as the log of real annual total compensation cost (LFRAISRE). The
regressions were run on two data sets, the rst containing all observations
and the second being identical to the rst with the outliers eliminated
20
.
For each data set, I estimated returns to seniority under two dierent spec-
ications. In the rst (model 1), I included only the level of job seniority
(along with all of the other elements of the X
i;T
0
+t
matrix), while in the
second (model 2) I included job seniority, seniority squared, cubed and to
the fourth power in addition to all of the variables used in the rst regres-
sion. Table 5.1 presents the results of each of the two OLS regressions on
each of the two data sets.
I next estimate returns to job seniority using a specication that allows
for individual-specic heterogeneity of the form
log (y
i;T
0
+t
) = X
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i
+ "
i;T
0
+t
where all of the variables are as dened above. In order to control for the
individual-specic eects, I project the X
i;T
0
+t
and log (y
i;T
0
+t
) onto their
20
An outlier was dened as any observation for which the log of the real total annual
compensation cost was more than 5 standard deviations away from its predicted value.
See section 4 and AKM [1994] for details.
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Table 5.1: OLS Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
Variable All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 3.386 3.394 3.397 3.405
(1.17E-3) (1.17E-3) (1.06E-3) (1.06E-3)
Seniority 0.012 0.071 0.011 0.062
(3.70E-5) (3.38E-4) (3.36E-5) (3.06E-4)
Seniority
2
=100 0 -1.132 0 -1.017
(6.31E-4) (5.74E-3)
Seniority
3
=1000 0 0.643 0 0.583
(3.93E-3) (3.57E-3)
Seniority
4
=10000 0 -0.109 0 -0.099
(7.69E-4) (6.99E-4)
Experience 0.057 0.045 0.056 0.046
(2.97E-4) (3.05E-4) (2.70E-4) (2.78E-4)
Experience
2
=100 -0.249 -0.124 -0.244 -0.132
(2.72E-3) (2.78E-3) (2.47E-3) (2.54E-3)
Experience
3
=1000 0.056 0.011 0.055 0.014
(9.20E-4) (9.40E-4) (8.38E-4) (8.56E-4)
Experience
4
=10000 -5.13E-3 -2.99E-4 -5.02E-3 -5.61E-4
(1.03E-4) (1.05E-4) (9.34E-5) (9.52E-5)
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Table 5.1: OLS Results (Continued)
Variable All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Elementary -0.043 -0.046 -0.040 -0.041
School (1.81E-3) (1.80E-3) (1.65E-3) (1.64E-3)
Junior High 0.418 0.396 0.421 0.400
School (2.62E-3) (2.61E-3) (2.38E-3) (2.37E-3)
High School 0.608 0.584 0.616 0.592
Grad (3.00E-3) (2.99E-3) (2.73E-3) (2.72E-3)
Basic 0.236 0.209 0.233 0.209
Vo-Tech (1.54E-3) (1.54E-3) (1.40E-3) (1.40E-3)
Advanced 0.571 0.545 0.573 0.547
Vo-Tech (2.65E-3) (2.64E-3) (2.41E-3) (2.40E-3)
Tech U / 0.565 0.557 0.568 0.559
Undergrad (2.56E-3) (2.55E-3) (2.33E-3) (2.32E-3)
Graduate 1.310 1.294 1.335 1.319
School (2.93E-3) (2.92E-3) (2.68E-3) (2.66E-3)
Male 0.201 0.197 0.199 0.194
(4.91E-4) (4.90E-4) (4.47E-4) (4.46E-4)
Paris Region 0.138 0.142 0.141 0.144
(5.06E-4) (5.03E-4) (4.60E-4) (4.57E-4)
R
2
= 0:277 R
2
= 0:284 R
2
= 0:316 R
2
= 0:323
n = 4; 784; 284 n = 4; 765; 997
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individual-specic means. I thus estimate an equation of the form
g
log (y
i;T
0
+t
) =
g
X
i;T
0
+t
+ g"
i;T
0
+t
(5.2)
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g
log (y
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0
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) = log (y
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0
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)   log (y
i
)
g
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 X
i
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0
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  "
i
and the terms log (y
i
), X
i
, and "
i
refer to means of the relevant variables
over all observations corresponding to individual i
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.I use the same data as
used in estimating equation (5.1), thus descriptive statistics can be found
once again in table 4.1. The results of the estimations of each of the two
OLS regressions on each of the two data sets are found in table 5.2.
As has been noted by others, the estimated returns to seniority that
one nds in the OLS estimates (coecients on level seniority of 0.071 on
the whole sample, 0.062 for the sample with outliers eliminated) are greatly
reduced when one includes individual specic eects (coecients on level
seniority of 0.029 on the whole sample and 0.026 on the outliers-eliminated
sample). However, these estimators do not make any allowance for rm
specic heterogeneity in compensation, which the following three estimators
(Topel, AKM and the cohort-based estimator) explicitly model.
5.2. The Topel Estimator and Its Relation to the AKM Estima-
tors
I next calculated returns to job seniority using the estimator suggested
in Topel [1991]. In the rst step of the estimation process, I calculated
rst dierences within individual-rmpairs for the outliers-eliminated data.
Sample statistics for this data set appear in table 5.3 below
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. As described
in section 2.2.1 above, an equation of the form
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I am assuming that "
i;T
0
+t
is distributed such that not only is E
 
"
i;T
0
+t

= 0, but
also E
 
"
I;T
0
+t
j I = i

= 0 for all i.
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Note that the coecient on dierenced seniority is not exactly 1. This is because the
data allowed us to determine what fraction of the year and individual was employedwith
the same rm. Thus factors that might allow contiued employment with the same rm
in which seniority and experience increase by less that 1 each year (temporary layos,
for example) might be the source of the dierence. See Topel [1991] for a discussion of
the impact that this might have on estimated returns to seniority.
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Table 5.2: Individual Fixed-Eect Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
Variable All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Seniority 2.35E-3 0.029 2.05E-3 0.026
(4.72E-5) (2.99E-4) (4.05E-5) (2.57E-4)
Seniority
2
=100 0 -0.460 0 -0.416
(5.59E-3) (4.79E-3)
Seniority
3
=1000 0 0.254 0 0.231
(3.43E-3) (2.94E-3)
Seniority
4
=10000 0 -0.044 0 -0.040
(6.60E-4) (5.66E-4)
Experience 0.084 0.078 0.084 0.078
(3.01E-4) (3.12E-4) (2.59E-4) (2.68E-4)
Experience
2
=100 -0.364 -0.301 -0.359 -0.303
(2.88E-3) (2.99E-3) (2.47E-3) (2.56E-3)
Experience
3
0.084 0.062 0.083 0.064
/1000 (1.01E-3) (1.05E-3) (8.71E-4) (9.01E-4)
Experience
4
-7.27E-3 -4.97E-3 -7.18E-3 -5.12E-3
/10000 (1.18E-4) (1.21E-4) (1.01E-4) (1.04E-4)
Paris Region 0.073 0.074 0.081 0.081
(1.15E-3) (1.15E-3) (9.93E-4) (9.91E-4)
R
2
= 0:749 R
2
= 0:750 R
2
= 0:789 R
2
= 0:789
n = 4; 784; 284 n = 4; 765; 997
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Data used in the First Step Topel
Regression
Variable Name Dierenced Data
Mean Std. Dev.
LFRAISRE 0.035 0.270
Seniority/Experience 0.963 0.149
Seniority
2
=100 0.164 0.143
Seniority
3
=1000 0.355 0.471
Seniority
4
=10000 0.815 1.411
Experience
2
=100 0.361 0.233
Experience
3
=1000 1.382 1.488
Experience
4
=10000 5.556 7.897
was then estimated on the dierenced data. This equation was estimated
in two forms: with the parameter restriction 
2
= 
3
= 
4
= 0 (only level
seniority included, denoted Model T1A below) and without any parameter
restrictions (Model T1B below). The results of these rst-step models are
shown in table 5.4 below.
Exploiting the identity X
i;T
0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+ t, Topel [1991] showed that
one can separate the estimated coecient on seniority into a component
that can be attributed to seniority returns and a component that can be
attributed to experience returns. This involves regressing the dierence be-
tween current log compensation and predicted log compensation (according
the results from the rst step estimation) on total labor market experience
at the date the job was started (Exp
i;T
0
) and a vector of other individual
specic variables that might be correlated with earnings. I thus estimated
the model
g
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and F
i;T
0
+t
corresponds to the other individual-specic components. The
results of estimations of this model based on the restricted (Model T2A
below) and unrestricted (Model T2B below) rst- step estimates appear in
table 5.5 below.
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Table 5.4: First Step Topel Model Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
Variable Dierenced Data
Model T1A Model T1B
Seniority + Experience 0.087 0.106
(6.83E-4) (7.44E-4)
Seniority
2
=100 0 -0.551
(9.32E-3)
Seniority
3
=1000 0 0.300
(6.21E-3)
Seniority
4
=10000 0 -0.052
(1.25E-3)
Experience
2
=100 -0.297 -0.231
(6.46E-3) (6.60E-3)
Experience
3
=1000 0.057 0.040
(2.28E-3) (2.34E-3)
Experience
4
=10000 -3.78E-3 -2.26E-3
(2.61E-4) (2.66E-4)
R
2
= 0:020 R
2
= 0:022
n = 2; 517; 026
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Table 5.5: Second Step Topel Model Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
Variable All Observations (Outliers Removed)
Model T2A Model T2B
Initial Experience 0.074 0.070
(4.31E-5) (4.17E-5)
Elementary School 3.225 3.242
(3.20E-3) (3.10E-3)
Junior High School 4.605 4.6036
(4.97E-3) (4.81E-3)
High School Grad 3.934 3.949
(6.02E-3) (5.82E-3)
Basic Vo-Tech 3.797 3.807
(2.30E-3) (2.22E-3)
Advanced Vo-Tech 2.618 2.669
(5.34E-3) (5.16E-3)
Tech U/Undergrad 3.548 3.607
(5.01E-3) (4.84E-3)
Graduate School 2.084 2.164
(6.07E-3) (5.87E-3)
Male 0.729 0.736
(9.86E-4) (9.52E-4)
Paris Region 0.408 0.395
(1.06E-3) (1.06E-3)
R
2
= 0:950 R
2
= 0:958
n = 4; 765; 997
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Topel [1991] noted that his estimators of joint returns to seniority and
returns to initial experience would be biased as long as job changing was
not exogenously generated. He suggested a procedure designed to indicate
the direction of the bias. Table 5.6 below shows how the estimates of the
joint returns to seniority and experience (in levels shown in table 5.4) gen-
erated by each of the two models (Model A with the parameter restrictions
and Model B unrestricted) are broken down into seniority and experience
components, as well as estimates of one of the components of the bias. A
positive value for the bias term suggests that true returns to level experi-
ence are lower than estimated, and thus returns to seniority are higher than
estimated.
Table 5.6: Estimated Returns Using the Topel Two-Step Method
Model Type Total Seniority Experience Wage Growth
Returns Bias
Model A 0.087 0.013 0.074 -0.071
Model B 0.106 0.036 0.070 -0.058
These results suggest that, consistent with the OLS and the xed eects
estimators, including the higher order terms in seniority has a dramatic
eect on estimated returns to seniority. The estimated coecients suggest
proles that rise more or less rapidly, according to the estimation procedure,
and later atten out as seniority increases. The largest estimated level
returns to seniority come from the OLS procedure (6.2 percent per year on
the outliers-eliminated sample), while simple individual xed eects causes
this estimate to drop to 2.6 percent per year. Controlling simultaneously
for individual and rm eects (as Topel's procedure does) causes seniority
returns to rise slightly (to 3.6 percent per year), although the wage growth
bias estimates suggest that this might be illusory.
All of these procedures, however, have found signicant (however small)
returns to seniority in the fully saturated specications on the outliers-
eliminated data. All of these procedures share a commonproblem, however;
they assume that all rms reward seniority in the same manner. If this
assumption were to be violated, the estimated returns to seniority would
be a sort of weighted average of the rm-specic returns. Thus even if only
a few rms in the sample rewarded seniority and these rms contributed
a high enough number of observations to the data set, we would run the
risk of estimating positive economy-wide returns, and we might incorrectly
assume that the majority of rms in the economy provided positive returns
to job seniority.
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AKM [1994] show that this is false. Their estimation procedure allows
them to account for individual- and rm- specic eects on earnings, as well
as estimating rm-specic returns to seniority. Using the same data as I use
here (the outliers-eliminated sample) and using a linear spline specication,
they nd no signicant returns to seniority (-3.37E-5 for men and 8.28E-4
for women across individuals). However, when looking across rms, they
nd a standard error in returns to seniority that is relatively large (0.077
relative to a mean across rms of 2.7E-3) and encompasses all of the above
estimated returns within one standard deviation of the mean estimated
returns to seniority. This implies that there is substantial heterogeneity in
estimated returns to seniority. If this estimated heterogeneity corresponds
to actual dierences in compensation policies, the self-selection problem
discussed in section 2 arises, suggesting that even these estimators might
be biased (see section 2.2.2).
5.3. The Cohort-Based Estimator
With the knowledge that there is substantial across-rm heterogeneity in
estimated returns to job seniority, I applied the procedure described in
section 3 to calculate the cohort-based estimator of \true" returns to job
seniority. Because the procedure is particularly demanding on the data, I
was not able to obtain large enough sample sizes for every cohort in ev-
ery rm in the data. Thus each observation was assigned to one of three
subgroups: observations for which there was sucient information to cal-
culate cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
terms for use in the regression described by
equation (3.3), observations for which there was not enough information to
calculate a cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
terms but for which one could calculate
a rm specic ^
j
, and observations for which I could calculate neither rm
nor cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
terms, but for whom I could calculate cohort
specic (but not rm specic) ^
T
0
terms for use in the regression described
in equation (3.3)
23
. The cohort-rm group contained 3,471,425 observa-
tions, the rm only group 701,892 observations and the cohort only group
1,131,791 observations. This distribution of observations across groups is
encouraging in two respects. First, for 79 percent of the observations I am
able to estimate at least a rm specic ^
j
, and 83 percent of these obser-
23
Clearly, observations corresponding to individuals employed in larger rms are more
likely to be found in the rst and second groups, whil observations corresponding to
smaller employers are more likely to be found in the third group. Unfortunately there
is no way to recover cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
when there is not enough data present.
Thus the estimation strategy implicitly imposes a sort of \ocean of small, identical rms"
constraint, in which small rms are assumed to reward seniority identically, although this
oered rate of return still competes with that of the larger rms in the eyes of potential
employees for the purposes of self-selection.
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vations can be used to recover the relevant cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
terms
needed to estimate the true 
j
. Second, for all of the observations in the
21 percent for which neither ^
j
nor ^
j;T
0
is directly estimable, I am able to
recover cohort specic ^
T
0
, although the estimated ^
T
0
will be a weighted
average of the component rms' ^
T
0
terms
24
.
The AKM [1994] procedure was followed up to the point where they
estimate rm-specic intercepts and seniority splines. Thus the estimated
eects of education, total labor market experience, sex and region on the
log of total real annual compensation are unchanged. I then estimated
the rst part of the cohort estimator (equation (3.1) in section 3). For
the cohort-rm group (group 3 in table 5.7), I estimated equation (3.1)
entering cohort by entering cohort, and for the rm only group (group 2 in
table 5.7) I pooled all observations within the same rm but retained the
rm specic estimate
25
. The estimated coecients were merged back in
with the seniority data and equation (3.3) was estimated rm by rm. For
the cohort only group (group 1 in table 5.7), I estimated equation (3.1) by
pooling all observations within the same cohort, independent of rm, and
running the regression cohort by cohort. These estimated coecients were
merged back in with the seniority data and equation (3.3) was estimated
over all observations in the cohort only group.
Using the cohort-based procedure suggested in section 3, I nd that the
equally-weighted mean of the \true" returns to seniority across all rms in
the sample is 6.31E-3, although the standard deviation of estimated true
returns across all rms in the sample is 0.120. This suggests that there is
a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the returns to seniority that rms
propose to their workers. Looking at the subsets of rms for which I was
able to recover rm specic true returns, similar results become apparent.
Over the entire set of 94,453 rms for which true returns were rm spe-
cic, the equally-weighted mean estimated true returns are -1.84E-4 with
a standard deviation of 0.282. On the subset of 83,424 rms for which the
estimated true returns involved the use of cohort-rm specic ^
j;T
0
(the
subset most closely meeting the requirements of the econometric proce-
dure), the equally-weighted mean was -7.89E-4 and the standard deviation
was 0.289. This suggests that the pooling techniques used to calculate ^
j
and ^
T
0
generate a positive, but very small, bias in estimates of true returns
to seniority, although the relatively large standard errors render even such
24
Although I was able to recover rm specic ^
j;T
0
or ^
j
for 79 percent of the obser-
vations, these observations covered only 22 percent of the rms in the sample (94,603
out of 521,182). This is not surprising since the sampling scheme was designed to be
randomwith respect to individuals and not rms, and thus the distribution of workers in
the sample across employers should be representative of the distribution of employment,
and not necessarily employers, in the economy as a whole.
25
This is essentially what is done in AKM [1994].
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Table 5.7: Results Using the Cohort-Based Estimator
All Groups
Variable Firms 1
a
2
b
&3
c
2
b
3
c
True ^
j
Mean (^
j
) 6.31E-3 7.75E-3 -1.84E-4 4.39E-3 -7.89E-4
Std. Dev. (^
j
) (0.120) 0 (0.282) (0.226) (0.289)
Mean (Var (^
j
)) 3.09E-4 6.16E11 1.70E-3 0 1.93E-3
Std. Dev. (Var (^
j
)) (0.158) 0 (0.372) 0 (0.396)
Dierence ^
1j
  ^
j
Mean (^
1j
  ^
j
) -3.32E-3 -4.47E-3 1.86E-3 -8.30E-4 2.22E-3
Std. Dev. (^
1j
-^
j
) 0.119 0 0.279 0.223 0.286
Pct. (^
1j
  ^
j
) > 0 9.8% 0% 53.8% 53.8% 53.8%
Correlations
^
j
with ^
1j
0.147 - 0.146 0.182 0.143
(^
1j
  ^
j
) with ^
j
-0.984 - -0.984 -0.972 -0.985
Pct. Reject:
T-test ^
j
= ^
1j
88.1% 100% 34.5% 51.9% 32.2%
Nb. of Firms 521,032 426,579 94,453 11,029 83,424
a
Group 1 refers to cohort-only estimates of true 
j
. AKM[1994] assigned one value to
all rms in this group, and the cohort-based estimator did likewise.
b
Group 2 refers to rm-only estimates of the true 
j
. Dierences between true 
j
and
^
1j
among group 2 rms are due exclusively to dierent critical levels (AKM [1994] used
10 observations, I use 4).
c
Group 3 refers to cohort-rm estimates of the true 
j
.
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weak conclusions suspect.
Furthermore, comparisons with the results obtained by AKM [1994] are
instruc-tive
26
. I nd that, for 88.1 percent of the rms in the data set, the
cohort based estimator generates results signicantly dierent from AKM's
results for level earnings. Perhaps surprisingly, the cohort-based estimator
is usually larger than the AKM level estimator. This suggests that, instead
of the more productive workers leaving later, they may hazard out of their
current employers at a faster rate than do the less productive workers.
However, a closer examination suggests that this eect relies heavily on the
pooled estimates, since 53.8 percent of the rms with cohort-rm estimated
^
j
show signs of positive bias.
Some interesting results come out of analyzing the correlation between
the estimated returns to seniority under both methods. First, the estimated
correlation between the cohort-based estimates and the AKM estimates,
although positive, is small (0.147 in the whole sample, 0.143 for the cohort-
rm estated enterprises). This is to be expected if the estimated returns in
rms with smaller true returns are more heavily biased than those in rms
with with larger true returns. This prediction of the theoretical model is
independent of the relative hazard rates (provided they are not identical).
It is also supported by the data, in that the dierence in estimated returns
decreases as true returns increases (correlation coecient of -0.984 overall
and -0.985 for the cohort-rm based estimates). Not only does this imply
that variance in cohort-based estimator far dominates variance in the AKM
estimator (even though the estimated variances at the rm-by-rm level are
not very dierent), but also that the two estimators are farthest apart when
true returns are lowest, which is consistent with the idea that the rms
that reward seniority the least will have the largest bias in their estimated
returns according to an econometric technique that does not account for
worker selection.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that one cannot ignore rm heterogeneity and worker
self-selectionwhen estimating returns to seniority. After developing a the-
oretical framework from which to explain the source of a potential bias in
estimators of returns to seniority that to not take into account worker self-
selection based on heterogeneity in compensation policies and subsequent
learning, a new estimator of \true" returns to seniority was developed. The
results generated by this estimator were compared to results generated by
26
In table 5.7, estimates using the cohort-based estimator are reered to as ^
j
, while
estimates using the AKM [1994] estimator are referred to as ^
1j
.
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an estimator proposed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (AKM) [1994],
as well as to estimators that do not allow for heterogeneous seniority re-
ward policies, such as OLS, individual xed eects and Topel's [1991] two
step estimator. The homogeneous returns estimators all signalled signif-
icantly positive returns to seniority, although the level of these returns
was rather variable. The new cohort-based estimator, on the other hand,
showed (like AKM's estimator) mean zero returns across rms, but signif-
icant rm-levelheterogeneity. As predicted by the theoretical model, the
bias in the AKM estimator was found to be largest for rms for whom
the \true" returns to seniority were smalles, suggesting that any estimator,
even one that takes into account across-rm heterogeneity in seniority re-
ward policies, will be biased unless one also accounts for work self-selection
to take advantage of the diversity of compensation policies proposed by the
market.
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